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RESEARCH
Responding to victimisation in a digital 
world: a case study of fraud and computer 
misuse reported in Wales
Sara Giro Correia* 
Abstract 
This paper presents the early results of a study exploring computer misuse and fraud victimisation in Wales, United 
Kingdom (UK). The results presented here describe the quality of the data available to local forces, the characteristics 
and heterogeneity of the victims who report incidents and the nature of the police response at a local level. The sig-
nificance of these results is considered within the enforcement and victimisation policy context that surrounds com-
puter misuse and fraud. It is argued that while Action Fraud data provides a rich source of data with respect to victims’ 
needs, specific improvements in data collection and processing could aid local forces in the delivery (or facilitation) 
of a more victim-focused response. Alongside this, the results highlight how an adequate police response must take 
victim heterogeneity into account, both at national and local levels. Finally, better understandings of vulnerability 
(both theoretically informed and empirically tested) are necessary, on which to build an adequate victim-response to 
these crime types.
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Introduction
Experiences of computer misuse (CM) and fraud vic-
timisation have increasingly occupied the public sphere. 
Their significance was highlighted in the United Kingdom 
(UK) from 2017, as these crimes integrated the yearly 
crime estimates produced by the Office for National Sta-
tistics (ONS). Recent estimates indicate that there were 
3.25 million incidents of fraud and 1.24 million incidents 
of CM1 in the year ending March 2018 (ONS 2018a), 
increasing the grand total from 6.01 to 10.57 million esti-
mated crimes (Ibid.). Alongside these figures stands the 
considerable investment government has committed to 
cyber security—£1.9 billion by 2021 (HM Government 
2016).2 Finally, the threat and harm posed by these crime 
types have also attracted attention. Cases such as the 2007 
cyber-attack on Estonia and the Stuxnet worm aimed at 
Iran stand as examples of large national infrastructure 
attacks. Recently, 2017 was characterised by ransom ware 
attacks including WannaCry, which disrupted organi-
sations across the world, including UK hospitals. Since, 
data-breaches have made successive headlines, with mil-
lions of personal data records lost. However, it has been 
suggested that the mass media’s attention often focuses 
on ideal victims and perpetrators (Christie 1986) and 
fails to properly scrutinise ‘official’ narratives, primar-
ily put forward by criminal justice institutions and large 
business victims (Jarvis et al. 2015; Levi 2006, 2008). As 
such, better and empirically grounded understandings of 
these crime types are necessary.
At the same time, the process by which victims report 
CM and fraud and the ways in which victim services are 
delivered have changed significantly in the UK. Firstly, 
the reporting of cybercrime and fraud has improved with 
the introduction of the national reporting centre, Action 
Fraud (AF). Its introduction mirrored the equivalent in 
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1 Including computer virus and unauthorised access to personal information.
2 Up from £860 million in the previous 5-year term. To illustrate de enor-
mity of this investment, this sum would be sufficient to give every individual 
in the UK over £6000 over the same period.
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the USA and Canada and had been recommended by The 
Fraud Review (2006) and academic experts (Button et al. 
2009a; Levi and Burrows 2008). Additionally, victim sup-
port services have been considerably decentralised from 
their previous model (Hall 2018). These services became 
(or reverted to) local delivery, with the addition of com-
petitive bidding for service providers wishing to deliver 
those services, funded through the Office of the Police 
and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) (Ibid.). These changes 
have taken place in the context of a computer crime and 
fraud policing strategy which, following the counter-ter-
rorism ‘CONTEST’ model, is divided into ‘4 Ps’: ‘Pursue’ 
offenders through prosecution and disruption, ‘Prepare’ 
to mitigate against the impact of incidents, ‘Protect’ indi-
viduals, organisations and systems against being victim-
ised and ‘Prevent’ people from engaging in crime (City of 
London Police 2015b; HM Government 2013, 2018). The 
‘Protect’ strand is the one that is more clearly linked to 
a victim-focused response. Here, discussions with stake-
holders revealed a policy of local delivery supported by 
national resources such as the NFIB. The responsibility 
of ‘volume’ crime prevention (i.e. that which is not con-
sidered ‘serious organised crime’) falls to local police 
forces, following prioritisation by PCCs and Chief Con-
stables (City of London Police 2015a). Third sector 
organisations such as Victim Support are meant to lead 
on addressing victim impact and reducing repeat vic-
timisation (Draft NPFS 2015a, b). In addition, at the local 
level Police and Crime Reduction Plans often strategically 
focus ‘Protect’ activity on ‘vulnerable’ victims (e.g. Dyfed 
Powys PCC 2017; Gwent PCC 2017; North Wales PCC 
2017; South Wales PCC 2017). Thus, this area of crime 
control requires the interaction of UK law enforcement 
agencies across three levels: the National Fraud Intel-
ligence Bureau (NFIB) determines what is investigated, 
the Regional Organised Crime Units (ROCUs) support 
strategic delivery and large-scale investigations and the 
local forces investigate and deliver victim-response ‘on 
the ground’.
In this context, this paper seeks to critically engage 
with challenges of responding the computer misuse and 
fraud victimisation by considering three questions: (1) 
How can data collection be improved to best enable local 
forces to meet victim needs? (2) How heterogeneous are 
victims who report CM and fraud in Wales? And (3) How 
is law enforcement responding to these crimes at a local 
level? It does so by drawing on the early results of the 
quantitative element of a larger mixed-methods study, 
utilising a sample of crimes reported via AF, for a period 
of 2 years (1st of October 2014 to the 30th of September 
2016), within the four Welsh police forces. In answering 
these questions, this paper also concludes by pointing to 
avenues for future research. This paper focuses on fraud 
and CM for two reasons. Firstly, except for some impor-
tant contributions (Buchanan and Whitty 2014; Button 
et  al. 2009b, 2014; Whitty 2015) there remains limited 
academic study of victimisation in this area. Secondly, the 
initial scoping research indicated that the overall impact 
of these crimes on victims, especially in terms of their 
volume and associated costs, as well as the vulnerability 
of victims were priorities in public discourse and aca-
demic literature (Anderson et al. 2013; Blakeborough and 
Correia 2018; Buchanan and Whitty 2014; Button et  al. 
2009b, 2014; Home Office 2018b; McGuire and Dowling 
2013; Whitty 2015).
Finally, what is meant by computer misuse and fraud in 
this paper should be clarified and the author’s avoidance 
of the term ‘cybercrime’ explained. ‘Cybercrime’ is used 
to refer to a diverse range of illegal activity which occurs 
primarily within an electronic environment, enabled 
by the Internet (Yar 2006).3 Given the wide scope of the 
term however, it is useful to break ‘cybercrime’ down fur-
ther into sub-categories. As such, the author started this 
enquiry by drawing on several existing typologies (par-
ticularly Home Office 2018a, b; Levi et al. 2017; Levi and 
Burrows 2008; McGuire and Dowling 2013; Yar 2006), to 
identify what types of (cyber) crime may be of interest 
(see Fig. 1). However, ‘cybercrime’ is a contested term and 
its usefulness may be questioned altogether (Grabosky 
and Smith 1998), especially where the aim is to under-
stand victims’ perspective and the extent to which victim 
policy is adequate and effectively implemented. Crucially 
for this study, the boundaries between “cyber” and “tra-
ditional” crime were found to be blurred. In line with 
previous research (Levi et al. 2017),4 it became apparent 
that the author’s attempt at coding data according to an 
on/offline dichotomy was impossible.5 Furthermore, the 
Modus Operandi (MO) of a crime should not substan-
tially change the principles that inform victim response. 
As such, this article will not exclusively consider crimes 
with a “cyber” element, but instead cases of victimisation 
associated with crimes of fraud and computer misuse, as 
defined by the Fraud Act 2006 and the Computer Misuse 
3 This includes new crimes which did not exist prior to networked computers 
(cyber-dependent crimes), as well as crimes which pre-date the Internet but 
have been significantly “transformed” by it (cyber-enabled) (Wall 2001). To 
these we may also add cyber-assisted crimes, where ICT is used “in the course 
of criminal activity which would take place anyway” (Levi et al. 2017, p. 81).
4 In a study that analysed 106,681 crime reports made to Action Fraud 
across police forces in England and Wales, between October to December 
2014, the authors identified that the most common mode by which offend-
ers first contacted their victims was by phone or text (35%), followed by 
contact after the victim visited a website (18%), contact in person (12%), by 
letter and fax (11%) and by email (8%) (Levi et al. 2017, p. 82).
5 This was not surprising with respect to fraud as many Modus Operandi 
(MO) have been found to straddle the on/offline divide (e.g. Button et  al. 
2012; Gini et al. 2017; Levi 2017; Levi et al. 2017).
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Act 1990 respectively, whether they have on/offline ele-
ments or both.6
Methods
This paper reports on a sub-set of early results from a 
study based on N = 17,049 computer misuse (CM) and 
fraud reports, made by victims within the Welsh police 
forces (Dyfed/Powys, Gwent, North Wales and South 
Wales), via the UK‘s national reporting centre Action 
Fraud (AF). The data relating to all crimes7 reported 
over a 2-year period between the 1st October 2014 and 
the 30th September 2016 were returned to the respec-
tive forces who agreed to share this with the researcher 
via the Southern Wales Regional and Organised Crime 
Unit (ROCU), a partner organisation in this project. 
While it was possible to access the full population of AF 
victim reports at the time the data was collected, insights 
from crime reports collected prior to October 2014 
were considered less reliable due to the transition into 
the AF reporting system. As such, all records available 
at the point of data collection from October 2014 were 
collected.
To undertake this research, the author underwent a 
process of security vetting, enabling her to access, clean 
and anonymise the data within the ROCU’s secure 
environment. The anonymised dataset was then further 
analysed at Swansea University, whose Ethics Board 
reviewed and approved the project prior to its com-
mencement. Given the project’s aim to improve the 
response to victims of CM and fraud, a strong public-
interest rationale justified the use of this administrative 
dataset. Nonetheless, as the original dataset identified 
victims of crime, the handling of this sensitive informa-
tion carried the risk of loss of anonymity and subsequent 
harm to participants. As such, a strict protocol for data 
access, anonymisation, storage and reporting was fol-
lowed in order ensure these risks were mitigated.
A data-driven mixed methods methodology was 
employed. Mixed-methods is understood as “the type of 
research in which a researcher… combines elements of 
qualitative and quantitative research approaches… for 
the purposes of breadth and depth of understanding and 
corroboration” (Johnson et  al. 2007, p. 123). AF reports 
contained both quantitative and qualitative data, each 
suited to different methods of analysis and to answer 
different research questions. As such, a mixed-methods 
approach was appropriate and a sequential explanatory 
design used (Creswell et  al. 2003; Ivankova et  al. 2006). 
This paper reports on the first stage in this sequence, 
where structured data from the AF database was quanti-
tatively analysed, to explore reported incidents and police 
response.
A descriptive statistical analysis of the dataset was 
undertaken at first instance, including an exploration and 
testing of variables’ distribution and measures of central 
tendency. This enabled a better understanding of the 
quality of the data and the characteristics of the popula-
tion of reporting victims. Subsequently, several theoreti-
cally informed statistical hypotheses were tested using 
inferential frequentist methods. Given that the dataset 
contained a variety of categorical (e.g. gender), interval 
Fig. 1 Cybercrime typology, based on Home Office (2018a, b), Levi et al. (2017), Levi and Burrows (2008), McGuire and Dowling (2013) and Yar 
(2006)
7 ‘Crimes’ include all cases reported and recorded as crimes by Action 
Fraud, following the Home Office Counting Rules.
6 At the time of writing, Home Office Counting Rules define 15 fraud cat-
egories relevant to individual and business victims (containing a further 24 
sub-categories between them) and three computer misuse categories (with a 
further seven sub-categories between them). In total, this amounts to eight 
unique categories of computer misuse offences and 41 unique fraud catego-
ries. Given that working with 49 categories would be impractical and of lim-
ited statistical use, the crime categories in the original dataset was combined 
and re-coded into nine fraud categories and two computer misuse categories 
as specified in Table 1.
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Table 1 Translation between fraud and computer misuse crime categories used in this study and NFIB codes
Analytical category Original dataset category NFIB code
Consumer fraud Online shopping and auctions NFIB3A
Consumer phone fraud NFIB3B
Other consumer and retail fraud NFIB3D
Computer software service fraud NFIB3E
Ticket fraud NFIB3F
Charity fraud NFIB4A
Insurance broker fraud NFIB6B
Door to door sales and bogus tradesmen NFIB3C
Advance-fee fraud “419” advance fee fraud NFIB1A
Lottery scams NFIB1B
Counterfeit cheques, bankers drafts and employment opportunities NFIB1C
Dating scam NFIB1D
Fraud recovery NFIB1E
Inheritance fraud NFIB1F
Rental fraud NFIB1G
Other advance fee frauds NFIB1H
Lender loan fraud NFIB1 J
Investment fraud Pension fraud committed on pensioners NFIB16B
Pension liberation fraud NFIB16C
Share/bond sales or boiler room fraud NFIB2A
Pyramid or ponzi schemes NFIB2B
Prime bank guarantees NFIB2C
Time shares and holiday club fraud NFIB2D
Other financial investment NFIB2E
Card and banking fraud Fraud by false representation cheque, plastic card and online bank accounts (not PSP) NFIB5A
Services fraud Application fraud (excluding mortgages) NFIB5B
Telecom industry fraud (misuse of contracts) c
Mandate fraud NFIB5D
Fraudulent applications for grants from charities NFIB4B
Mortgage related fraud NFIB5C
Insurance related fraud NFIB6A
Dishonestly retaining a wrongful credit NFIB5E
Pension fraud by pensioner (or their estates) NFIB16A
Retail fraud Retail fraud NFIB3G
Business compromise Business trading fraud NFIB9
Corporate employee fraud NFIB8A
False accounting NFIB10
Corporate procurement fraud NFIB8B
Bankruptcy and insolvency NFIB11
Public fraud Fraudulent applications for grants from government funded organisations NFIB14
DVLA driving licence application fraud NFIB20A
HM revenue and customs fraud (HMRC) NFIB15
Department of works and pensions (DWP) fraud NFIB13
Other fraud Fraud not covered elsewhere NFIB90
Other regulatory fraud NFIB17
Fraud by failing to disclose information NFIB18
Fraud by abuse of position of trust NFIB19
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(e.g. number of repeats) and ratio data (e.g. loss and 
age), statistical tests were carried as appropriate. In this 
paper results relating to Pearson Chi squared tests (χ2) 
are reported to identity significant differences between 
sub-groups of victims. The odds ratio and Cramèr’s V are 
reported where appropriate as measures of effect size. 
Finally, where χ2 was found to provide limited insight, 
generalised linear models (GLMs) were used to aid visu-
alisation and interpretation of results. GLMs replicate 
or replace many of the traditional statistical tests, while 
allowing the researcher to focus on interpretation of 
models through a standard (visual) method (Field et  al. 
2012; Fox 2003; Fox and Weisberg 2011; Hutcheson and 
Schaefer 2012; Hutcheson and Sofroniou 1999).
There are several limitations when using police 
recorded crime (PRC) for statistical analysis, and some 
are particular to CM and fraud (Flatley 2013; Levi and 
Burrows 2008). PRC only captures crime which was 
reported to and recorded by the police. As such, it pro-
vides an insight into reporting/recording rather than 
crime patterns or victimisation risk. This limitation is 
especially relevant with respect to the crime types under 
consideration as they are comparatively under-reported. 
It is estimated that only 14.5% of CM and fraud experi-
enced by individuals were reported to the police in the 
year ending September 2018 (ONS 2019, Tables A1 and 
A4).8 In comparison, 55.9% of thefts were reported to the 
police in the same period (Ibid.).9 In addition, concerns 
have been raised over the process of “criming”, i.e. attrib-
uting a crime label to a reported incident in accordance 
with the UK’s Home Office Counting Rules (HOCR) 
(Home Office 2015). Issues regarding compliance with 
HOCR and recording practices led to PRC losing its sta-
tus as approved national statistics in 2014 (UKSA 2014).10 
Finally, high levels of ‘attrition’ have been reported in the 
recording of fraud and CM (Scholes 2018) and, as with 
administrative data more broadly, AF data was collected 
for the administration of justice and is thus not optimised 
for the purposes for which it was analysed here.
Nonetheless, AF data remains useful where the focus of 
the enquiry is the CJS response towards victims. While 
enquiry is limited to reported crime, it is also the case 
that responding to victim needs must start with those 
who come forward to report. Previous research has 
shown that trust in the police and a belief that the police 
can do something about the issue are important factors 
influencing whether victims report crime (MacDon-
ald 2001; Skogan 1984; Zawitz et  al. 1993). As such, an 
adequate police response is a factor in driving reporting 
behaviour. Previous research has also indicated that the 
victims’ perception of the seriousness of the crime, is 
the most important factor leading to a decision to report 
crime (Skogan 1984; Tarling and Morris 2010). Simi-
larly, a cost–benefit analysis or the opportunity-costs for 
the victim involved in reporting also constitute factors 
in decisions to report crime (Goudriaan 2006; Skogan 
1984). In fact, the seriousness of the crime and/or a cost–
benefit rationale were given as prominent reasons for not 
reporting to AF—although lack awareness of the service 
was the most common reason cited for not reporting.11 
Table 1 (continued)
Analytical category Original dataset category NFIB code
Hacking Hacking-server NFIB52A
Hacking-personal NFIB52B
Hacking of social media and email NFIB52C
Hacking: PBX/dial through NFIB52D
Hacking (extortion) NFIB52E
Malware, virus and (D)DOS Computer Virus\\Malware\\Spyware NFIB50A
Denial of Service attack NFIB51A
Denial of Service attack (extortion) NFIB51B
9 Calculation based on a total number of theft offences estimated at 
3,574,000 for the UK population in the year ending September 2018 
(Table A1), against the number of theft offences reported to the police for 
the same period at 1,998,876 (Table A4).
10 The removal of the designation of “national statistics” from police recorded 
crime can therefore be interpreted to mean that police recorded crime—which 
includes the crime data supplied by police forces and Action Fraud (now run 
by a private provider for the National Fraud Investigative Bureau) to the Home 
Office—does not meet identified user needs; are not produced, managed and 
disseminated to high standards; and its limitations not well explained.
11 While ONS provided respondents with a wider selection of reasons 
(ONS 2017, Table  2), these were combined for ease of analysis by this 
researcher into “never heard of Action Fraud” (66%), “cost–benefit rationale” 
(19%), “crime reported elsewhere” (14%), “private matter” (8%), “other” (8%) 
and “don’t know” (1%).
8 Calculation based on a total number of fraud and computer misuse offences 
estimated at 4,477,000 for the UK population in the year ending September 
2018 (Table A1), against the number of such offences reported to the police 
for the same period at 650,051 (Table A4). The count including reports from 
industry bodies was used as some cases captured in the CSEW are unlikely 
to be recorded by Action Fraud, as a result of the application of Home Office 
Counting Rules.
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Finally, per the Victims’ Code, the seriousness and impact 
of the crime, victim characteristics such as living with a 
disability and circumstances such as being a repeat vic-
tim require an enhanced response from criminal justice 
agencies (MOJ 2015). The code extends to all victims of 
crime, the ‘right’ to be assessed according to such ‘vul-
nerability’ criteria. As such, one would expect to be able 
to identify within AF data significant detail to enable an 
adequate prioritisation and response to victims’ needs, as 
well as discharge victims’ service and procedural rights 
(Hall 2018).
As such, this paper will consider the quality of AF 
data in terms of two quality dimensions set out within 
the European Statistical System (Eurostat 2017; ONS 
2018b): (1) relevance and (2) accuracy and reliability. Rel-
evance is the degree to which data meet the users exist-
ing and emerging needs. Accuracy and reliability concern 
whether the sourced data is accurately recorded and reli-
ably reflect the reality they seek to capture. While PRC 
does not currently carry the quality seal of UK ‘official’ 
statistics, these principles remain are useful in consider-
ing the quality of AF data.
Results and discussion
Data quality
Issues affecting the accuracy and reliability of AF data 
include data ‘missingness’ as well as errors in process-
ing, measurement and coding. The level of missing data 
in salient AF variables was high and is summarised in 
Table  2. Missingness was highly prevalent in the origi-
nal variables, but also in the variables derived/coded by 
the author, due to lack of detail and inconsistencies in 
some records. For example, several variables were coded 
based on the free-text incident description. However, 
some descriptions were missing and the level of detail 
variable. In addition, 664 duplicates were found within 
the dataset, indicating some processing error before the 
data was shared with the local forces. Finally, the author’s 
manual coding exercise identified some inconsistencies 
with respect to the original AF coding, particularly in 
the attribution of crime type category to incidents e.g. a 
‘Denial of Service attack’ (DOS) recorded where ‘Hack-
ing’ would have been a more appropriate category.
Action Fraud data shared with local forces could be 
much improved in terms of its ‘fitness’ to be used to con-
duct victim vulnerability assessments. Extra fields which 
may enable local forces to develop a better picture of 
local victims’ needs include the type of victim (e.g. indi-
vidual, business, charity or public sector organisation), 
gender, whether there is an on-line element to the inci-
dent, victim’s gender, whether the victim has accessibility 
needs or is a repeat victim. The author could derive some 
of this information from the dataset through a combina-
tion of automated and manual linkage and coding. How-
ever, this was a resource-intensive exercise which local 
forces may be unable to carry out. Finally, in discussions 
with stakeholders it transpired that some of this informa-
tion is collected centrally by AF/NFIB but is not shared 
with local forces. Even within the arguably limited terms 
within which ‘vulnerability’ is defined in the Victims’ 
Code (MOJ 2015),12 the data collected by AF and shared 
with local police forces appears insufficient to conduct a 
victim vulnerability assessment.
Victim heterogeneity
Significant differences were found with respect to crime 
types reported across victim characteristics, but the 
effect sizes were generally small. Differences in the crime 
types reported across victim groups are highlighted in 
Fig.  2. Among individual victims, a significant differ-
ence was found with respect to crime types reported 
across gender (χ2 (7) = 73.57, p < 0.01). However, in this 
case Cramer’s V (0.075) indicates that the effect size is 
small.13 Nonetheless, the standardized residuals suggest 
that the difference is driven by females being significantly 
more likely to report Advance fee fraud (p < 0.01) and 
males significantly more likely to report Investment fraud 
(p < 0.01). Based on the odds ratio, the odds of a victim 
of Advance fee fraud being female are 1.24 times higher, 
while the odds of a victim of Investment fraud being male 
are 2.35 times higher. In terms of ethnicity, a significant 
difference was found between crime categories reported 
by victims identified as White and Other (χ2 (7) = 18.17, 
p = 0.001, Cramér’s V = 0.05). The standardized residuals 
revealed that this was driven by the White ethnic group 
reporting significantly more advance fee fraud while 
Table 2 Distribution of loss (including loss = £0)
N: sample size; sd: standard deviation; max: maximum value
Type N Mean sd Median Max
All 11,874 25,8752.9 15,894,479 155 1,000,000,000
Buss. 1812 19,529.31 399,860.5 195 16,784,966
Ind. 9239 3723.1 60,012.27 150 5,000,000
12 The Victims Code defines a victim as “a natural person who has suffered 
harm, including physical, mental or emotional harm or economic loss which 
was directly caused by a criminal offence” (2015, p. 2). Furthermore, there are 
three categories of victims which are entitled to an enhanced service under 
the code: (1) victims of the most serious crimes, (2) persistently targeted vic-
tims and (3) vulnerable or intimidated victims. While victims of cybercrime 
and fraud are unlikely to fall under the first sub-category of victim entitled to 
enhanced service, they may fit the categories of persistently targeted, vulner-
able or intimidated victims.
13 Cramér’s V varies from 0 to 1, with a 1 indicting a perfect association.
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conversely, the Other group reported significantly less. 
Finally, a derived variable for age category grouping age 
data into UK Census categories was created and a signifi-
cant association between victim’s age category and the 
crime types they reported (χ2 (84) = 525.63, p < 0.00114). 
However, the detail of what drives a significant χ2 result 
becomes difficult to interpret where multiple catego-
ries result in large contingency tables. As such, the age 
category was re-coded into a new age variable split over 
four categories according to the age values for the first 
quartile, median (52) and third quartiles and a GLM 
predicting the logit of the probability of age category 
based on the crime reported was run in R statistics. The 
overall model significantly reduced residual deviance 
(χ2 (21) = 375.1, p < 0.0001) and the model’s effect dis-
play (Fig.  3) clearly demonstrates that victims reporting 
Investment and Advance fee fraud are more likely to be 
older, whereas those reporting Hacking, service fraud 
and Malware/DDOS/Virus more likely to be younger vic-
tims. This result is confirmed in the table summarising 
the statistical parameters (Table 3).
With respect to reported financial loss, Table 4 shows 
that loss data is highly spread, highlighting considerable 
differences between victims. A considerable number of 
reports (2682 or 21%) indicated a reported loss of £0. 
This observation should be interpreted with caution for 
two reasons. Firstly, there was a considerable amount of 
missing data with respect to loss (30%). Secondly, where 
the victim has declared an estimation of loss at the time 
of reporting, this may not reflect longer term and/or indi-
rect losses. On one hand these factors may result in an 
under-estimation of no-loss reports as the researcher 
noted that many no-loss reports were recorded as “miss-
ing data” in the loss variable (as opposed to “£0”).15 On 
the other, there may be some instances where the victim 
reports the crime before the (total) loss is known to them. 
Nonetheless, this sample is indicative that a considerable 
proportion of reports made relate to ‘unsuccessful’ frauds 
or hacks.16 The impact of financial loss being relative to 
the means of the victim, prioritising cases where there is 
some loss may help focus a victim response. Currently, 
only cases reporting losses over £100,000 should be auto-
matically picked up for further action at NFIB (Scholes 
2018, p. 6). However, this amount is far beyond a typical 
loss being reported by individuals (or even businesses) 
and research has previously shown that cybercrime 
and fraud may result in victim-impacts beyond finan-
cial loss. These may include feelings of stress, physical 
or mental health problems, strain on relationships and 
worsening personal credit rating, among others (Button 
et al. 2012). As such, to adequately prioritise cases for a 
Fig. 2 Frequency of type of crime (analytical categories) by victim type (N = 17,049)
14 There were two cells with minimum expected frequencies below 5 and the 
minimum expected frequency overall was 4.4. However, as previously noted, 
with a larger contingency table it is acceptable to have up to 20% of expected 
frequencies below 5, given that no expected frequencies are below 1 (Field 
et al. 2012, p. 818).
15 At the same time, the researcher also found instances where a loss amount 
was recorded by Action Fraud within free-text field for the incident descrip-
tion, but this was not recorded in the appropriate numerical variable. Issues of 
data accuracy and usefulness are returned to in the conclusion to this paper.
16 Although according to the Fraud Act 2006 the offence of fraud is com-
plete when a false representation is made, regardless of its outcome.
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victim-focused response, the reporting system may also 
need to capture victim-impacts beyond financial loss.
Finally, victim heterogeneity was found in terms of the 
level of repeat victimisation within the sampled data. 
In order to assess repeat victimisation, two new vari-
ables were computed from the original dataset prior to 
anonymisation: ‘repeat premises’ is a count of the num-
ber of repeat reports from the same premises by match-
ing victims’ first line of address and postcode (including 
all victims), ‘repeat victim’ is a count of how many reports 
from the same individual (excluding corporations) could 
be found by matching on victim’s name, date of birth and 
address.17 Overall, 30% of business reports were associ-
ated with repeat premises and 10% of individual reports 
emanated from repeat victims. In addition, as indicated 
in Tables 5 and 6, there was some variation in the number 
of times a business/individual repeatedly reported.
Police demand and response
Of all the reports received from victims within the four 
Welsh police forces for the period under study (N = 17,049), 
most crimes were reported by victims within the jurisdic-
tion of South Wales police force (41%). This is unsurpris-
ing as this is the area with the largest population as well as 
the most internet access. Of the reports received, 19% were 
‘actioned’ in some way (N = 3225), as indicated by hav-
ing been recorded as referred to a police force, a partner 
agency, classified with an outcome or progressed in some 
way on the AF dataset. In approximately 5% of all cases, 
the force by whom the case of actioned is known. Table 3 
provides a summary of the various categories of outcome 
identified in this dataset. Of the 19% of cases that were 
actioned, most were referred for enforcement-type actions. 
In contrast, fewer cases were actioned to address victim 
support needs as indicated by the lower percentage of cases 
referred to a partner agency (1%) and victim care (0.25%).
On one level, this is in line with the policy priorities 
set by the UK government in the National Cyber Secu-
rity Strategy 2016–2021 (HM Government 2016) and the 
Serious and Organised Crime Strategy (HM Government 
2013, 2018). Both these strategies emphasise investigation 
of organised and persistent offenders and the protection 
of national critical infrastructure, while having less of a 
focus on victim support and what is referred to as high 
volume and/or low sophistication crime. In fact, the way 
in which Action Fraud reports are prioritised and selected 
for manual review by the NFIB for possible dissemina-
tion inherently favours investigation over other outcomes 
such as victim services or intelligence (Scholes 2018). At 
this crucial stage of the victim journey, AF reports are col-
lected in the NFIB’s “Known Fraud” database, whereby a 
Fig. 3 Effect plot of GLM model of age category ~ crime category
17 In order to maximise accuracy, all discrepancies between these two vari-
ables were manually checked as differences in spelling could lead to errors in 
the automated counts.
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computer programme selects cases for review and dis-
semination based on the existence of potential lines of 
enquiry (Ibid.). Victim vulnerability is not assessed cen-
trally in the same way. However, if victim-response is left 
for local forces to lead on, they would benefit from more 
guidance and better quality data (Table 7).
Conclusion
This paper considered the quality of the data which 
UK law enforcement agencies gather from victims of 
computer misuse and fraud offences, with respect to 
their information needs to provide an adequate victim 
response. Furthermore, it considered the heterogeneity of 
the victims who report and the level of police response. 
The analysis presented draws on the early results from 
a mixed-methods sequential study based on a sample of 
crime reports made within the four Welsh police forces 
to Action Fraud (AF), the UK’s national reporting centre.
It is argued that AF data provides a rich data source to 
identify victim needs. At the same time, specific improve-
ments in data collection and processing could aid local 
forces in the delivery of a victim-focused response, 
thereby properly addressing the government’s priorities as 
set out in the Victims Charter. As it stands, the data col-
lected by AF and shared with local police forces appears 
insufficient to conduct a victim vulnerability assessment. 
In addition, quality issues and under-reporting will neg-
atively impact on the strategic insight that can be drawn 
from this data.
While no large differences were found with respect to 
the types of crimes reported across demographic char-
acteristics, there was some heterogeneity in terms of the 
Table 3 Regression parameters for multinomial linear model age category ~ crime category
Model:  
log
(
Pr Y = j
Pr Y = j′
)
= β0 + β1 Crimecategory(Card and Banking)+ β2 Crimecategory(Consumer fraud)
+ β3 Crimecategory(Hacking)+ β4 Crimecategory(Investment fraud)
+ β5 Crimecategory(Malware, Virus and DDOS)+ β6 Crimecategory(Other fraud)
+ β7 Crimecategory(Services fraud)
  
where j′ = reference category (age category = 0–36 years old)
β0 = Advancefeefraud
Age category Parameter (crime category) Estimate (β) Standard error Wald statistic Odds-ratio
37–52 (Intercept) − 0.09 0.06 − 1.4 0.92
Card and banking − 0.24 0.14 − 1.8 0.79
Consumer fraud 0.14 0.08 1.9 1.15
Hacking 0.02 0.12 0.16 1.02
Investment fraud 0.98 0.98 3.2 2.7
Malware virus DDOS − 0.09 − 0.09 − 0.59 0.91
Other fraud − 0.01 − 0.01 − 0.12 0.99
Services fraud − 0.04 − 0.04 − 0.26 0.96
53–66 (Intercept) 0.18 0.06 3.0 1.20
Card and banking − 0.73 0.14 − 5.2 0.48
Consumer fraud − 0.16 0.07 − 2.2 0.85
Hacking − 0.80 0.13 − 6.06 0.45
Investment fraud 1.31 0.28 4.6 3.7
Malware virus DDOS − 0.32 0.15 − 2.08 0.73
Other fraud − 0.28 0.09 − 3.04 0.75
Services fraud − 0.76 0.18 − 4.23 0.47
> 67 (Intercept) 0.43 0.06 7.6 1.54
Card and banking − 1.03 0.14 − 7.3 0.36
Consumer fraud − 0.60 0.07 − 8.6 0.55
Hacking − 1.47 0.15 − 9.98 0.23
Investment fraud 1.02 0.28 3.6 2.8
Malware virus DDOS − 1.36 0.19 − 7.21 0.26
Other fraud − 0.45 0.09 − 5.04 0.64
Services fraud − 1.69 0.22 − 7.60 0.19
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financial losses and level of repeat victimisation. The pro-
portion of no-loss reports suggests that a victim-focused 
response needs to capture victim-impacts beyond finan-
cial loss. In addition, a small number of victims reported 
repeatedly over the time-period in question. Further 
research is needed to substantiate the link between 
repeat victimisation and vulnerability.
The meaning of ‘vulnerability’ also needs to be better 
understood in relation to victims of CM and fraud. The 
Code of Practice for Victims of Crime (MOJ 2015) and 
the crime plans developed by the Police and Crime Com-
missioners for each of the Welsh police forces (Dyfed 
Powys PCC 2017; Gwent PCC 2017; North Wales PCC 
2017; South Wales PCC 2017) all commit to protecting 
and responding to the needs of vulnerable victims. How-
ever, little is currently done in the way of analysing AF 
Table 4 Original and  coded variables according to  base, 
number of  unique levels and  percentage of  missing data 
(N = 17,049)
a Percentage missing calculated based on reports identified as relating to 
individual victims, N = 13,290 (businesses, charities and public sector victims 
excluded)
b Percentage missing calculated based on reports by business victims only, 
N = 2516
Base (n) Levels Missing (%)
Original variables
 Police force 17,049 4 0
 Reported date 17,049 751 0
 NFIB category 17,049 55 0
 Victim partial postcode 17,049 244 0
 Victim  agea 10,846 122 18
 Victim  ethnicitya 8668 17 35
 Financial loss 11,874 1971 30
 Force disseminated to 997 54 94
 Partner agency disseminated to 227 7 99
 Primary purpose (outcome) 1725 12 90
 Call for service progress 2228 14 87
Derived and (re)coded variables
 Crime category (analytical categories) 17,047 11 0.01
 Crime group (fraud/CM) 17,049 2 0
 Any online MO 15,431 2 9
 Any offline MO 15,339 2 10
 Mixed MO 15,339 2 10
 Crime MO group 15,339 3 10
 Victim type 15,952 3 6%
 Victim  gendera 13,011 2 2%
 Victim ethnic  groupa 8668 2 35
 Repeat victim (individual)a 13,290 8 0
 Repeat victim (premises) 17,049 19 0
 Business  sectorb 2428 21 3%
Table 5 Number of  reports (and %) from  the  same 
business premises (N = 2432) and  individual households 
(N = 13,290)
Number of reports Businesses 
premises
% Households %
1 (unique) 1710 70 11,777 89
2 322 13 1176 9
3 107 4 194 2
4 65 3 56 0.4
5–9 77 3 86 0.6
10–14 22 0.9 1 0.0
15–19 17 0.7 0 0
> 20 112 5 0 0
Table 6 Number of  reports (and %) from  the  same 
individual victims (N = 13,290)
Number of reports Individuals %
1 (unique) 11,977 90
2 1012 8
3 179 1
4 37 0.3
5 31 0.2
6 24 0.2
7 6 0.0
8 24 0.2
Table 7 Records of cases actioned, Wales (N = 17,049)
Recorded action Frequency Percentage 
of total
Actioned Enforcement 796 5
Force (misc) 14 0.08
Intelligence 10 0.06
Investigation closed 531 3
Investigation ongoing 1343 8
Partner agency referral 227 1
Prevention 175 1
Transferred to another 
force
86 0.5
Victim care 43 0.25
Total 3225 19
Not actioned Filed 329 2
No investigation 176 1
NA 13,319 78
Total 13,824 81
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data for indicators of vulnerability. To achieve this, fur-
ther research is needed into what these factors and indi-
cators are. Once vulnerability is properly understood 
with respect to these crime types, it is suggested that 
applying the latest technology such as machine learn-
ing to developing a referral system for victim support 
services would go some way to putting the victim at the 
centre of computer crime and fraud policy. This would 
require however, a higher level of accuracy in the record-
ing of these crime types. Alongside this, it is important to 
ensure that the various levels of policing and victim sup-
port responsibility do not result in a lack of ownership of 
victim support services.
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